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In recent years, the study of electoral irregularities has become a central and rapidly growing area of research in comparative politics. A first generation of studies have observed the regrettable persistence of electoral irregularities in a number of countries that have experienced recent democratic transitions and examined the macro-level factors that account for the persistence of electoral authoritarianism in recently democratized countries. 1 Other studies have taken a more micro-level approach to the study of electoral fraud and attempted to understand within-country variation in the strategies by which politicians and agents acting on their behalf seek to influence the electoral choices of voters. 2 One important conclusion that emerges from this recent body of scholarship is that electoral corruption is, in itself, a multidimensional phenomenon. Politicians can rely on a variety of strategies to influence the electoral choices of voters. A first possible strategy is vote buying, the distribution of individualized benefits at times of elections.
3 Another possible strategy is the provision of political services by government officials in exchange for political support. 4 In other electoral contexts, politicians do not seek to influence the choices made by voters at the ballot box through vote-buying or patronage, but through electoral intimidation. Electoral intimidation includes the use of threats directed against voters that support "undesired" political candidates and post-electoral reprisals directed against these voters. One common form of electoral punishment used by private actors is "electoral layoffs" in retaliation for the voting decisions of their workers. In contrast to vote buying or patronage, electoral intimidation perpetuated by employees of the state or by private actors has received less attention in the recent comparative literature.
Our paper attempts to characterize the economic and political factors that impinge upon the decision of politicians and other actors supporting particular candidates to engage in electoral intimidation of voters. We examine electoral politics in Imperial Germany, a political environment characterized by the ample use of intimidation at times of elections and by the absence of vote-buying or the provision of patronage. We provide a theoretical account of the incentives of public officials and private actors to engage in the production of electoral intimidation at times of elections and test our theoretical propositions using a dataset on electoral irregularities in Imperial Germany.
In a context of weakly developed political parties, candidates in a particular race turned to employees of the state (such as police, teachers, and tax collectors) and private actors for support at times of elections. These actors took over important pre-electoral responsibilities. These included the distribution of electoral information to voters, the distribution of ballots (which, according to the German electoral law, remained the responsibility of individual candidates), and the mobilization of voters at the times of elections. Electoral intimidation was the by-product of efforts to mobilize potential supporters and discourage efforts of opposition candidates to reach out to voters.
The willingness of state employees and private actors to engage in the production of electoral intimidation varied significantly across different districts and over time. Political and economic conditions in a district, we hypothesize, affected both the demand of individual candidates for electoral intimidation and, at the same time, posed constraints on the ability of public officials and private actors to supply electoral intimidation. Politicians' demand for electoral support from employees of the states and private actors at times of elections-which resulted in electoral irregularities-was affected by political variables in a district. We also develop a number of hypotheses about the factors that affected the calculations of employees of the state or private actors to supply electoral support to politicians. The calculations of the employees of the state were affected by political factors. By contrast, the decisions of employers were affected by a combination of political factors and economic conditions in a district.
We test these propositions through a quantitative analysis of the economic and political variables that affect the incidence of electoral fraud. We draw on the dataset of electoral complaints to the Parliamentary Commission of the Reichstag (Wahlprüfungskomission) compiled by Thomas Klein and Robert Arsenscheck and used by Daniel Ziblatt in a recent publication. 5 We augment this dataset with a large number of economic and political covariates. To test one of the hypotheses of our paper that links the economic heterogeneity of a district with the incidence of electoral fraud, we make use of the extremely fine-grained economic information collected by German statistical authorities as part of their occupational census (Gewerbezählung). The occupational census data provide information about the distribution of workers and firms in over 200 occupations in more than 1,000 localities and allow us to capture systematic variation in Germany's economic landscape of the time. We control for the most relevant political and economic variables at the level of the district, including landholding inequality, economic development, and religious diversity as well as for relevant political variables, such as levels of electoral competition.
The Production of Electoral Irregularities: Unpacking the Calculations of Candidates and Their Political Agents
This section seeks to characterize the factors that affect decisions of a variety of actors to engage in the production of electoral irregularities. We begin by characterizing the factors that affect the political demand of candidates for electoral support that trespassed the provisions of the electoral law. Next, we provide an analysis of the most significant factors that affect the decisions of employees of the state and private actors to supply this electoral support and intervene at times of elections. The considerations of public officials are affected by political variables. By contrast, the decisions of private actors to supply political support at times of elections are affected by additional economic conditions in the respective district.
The Demand of Candidates The production of electoral irregularities was a by-product of decisions made by individual candidates about the conduct of their electoral campaign, which included decisions about the modes in which the candidacy could be announced to voters, the holding of electoral rallies, the mobilization of voters at times of elections, and the monitoring of the latter at the moment they were casting their ballot. Due to the weak development of party organizations at the time, individual candidates bore an overwhelming amount of responsibility for the financing of their campaigns, the deployment of resources, and for the decision of whether or not to form electoral coalitions with other candidates competing in the district.
The first factor that was likely to affect the demand of candidates for additional electoral support from employees of the state or from private actors was the tightness of a race. We hypothesize that the demand for this political support was higher in tighter races. This hypothesis builds on a large comparative literature on the incidence of electoral corruption that has argued that "political competition fuels ballot rigging." 6 The narrowness of a race was likely to increase the sense of political urgency of candidates and the willingness of the latter to engage in more risk-seeking behavior, which involved decisions that violated the provisions of the electoral law.
A second variable that was likely to affect the political demand of candidates for activities that could trespass the boundaries of the electoral law was the strength of opposition candidates. After all, the main political objective of candidates accounting for the systematic deployment of the bureaucratic apparatus at times of elections and the reliance on the coercive power of German employers was the curtailment of the growth in electoral strength of the Social Democratic Party. Social Democratic mobilization, which challenged both the existing economic and political order, was seen as the primary political enemy of the Reich. As such, we expect that an increase in the political strength of Social Democrats in a race is likely to increase candidates' demand for the deployment of additional administrative and economic resources. We hypothesize, however, that the relationship between the strength of Social Democratic candidates in a district and the demand of candidates for electoral support from employees of the state and private actors is likely to be nonlinear. An increase in the political strength of Social Democratic candidates in a district is likely to increase demand for political support from employees of the state or private actors. However, at very high levels of Social Democratic support, the marginal political returns from electoral intimidation are likely to be low. In the latter cases, intimidation is unlikely to affect the outcome of a race. All things equal, we expect that the demand of candidates for electoral support from employees of the state and private actors is likely to be highest in districts with intermediate levels of electoral strength of Social Democratic candidates.
While political competition and the electoral strength of Social Democratic candidates is likely to increase the demand of candidates for the production of electoral irregularities, other political factors may have the opposite effect, constraining this political demand. Our main working hypothesis is that candidates refrained from using illicit electoral strategies if such strategies compromised their ability to form electoral coalitions. The need to form electoral coalitions was particularly pronounced in races that were determined in runoffs, which required electoral coordination among candidates who competed against each other during the first electoral rounds. The anticipation to coordinate in runoffs, we hypothesize, reduced candidates' demand for political help from police officers, tax collectors, and employers. In these districts, heavy-handed intervention of state employees on behalf of a particular candidate could turn into a liability and constrain the ability of the latter to form electoral coalitions with other candidates on the right. This leads to our third hypothesis about the determinants of political demand for electoral intimidation. We expect that the demand for electoral intimidation will be lower in districts that are contested in runoffs and where political fragmentation among right-wing parties is high as compared to districts that do not have this combination of political characteristics.
Employees of the State and Their Decision to Supply Political Services to
Candidates The above discussion has analyzed the determinants of the demand of candidates for additional electoral support. We will now examine the most salient factors that were likely to affect the cost-benefit calculation of employees of the state and their decisions to supply electoral intimidation when demanded by candidates. State employees were pervasive electoral agents in German elections. However, their electoral deployment varied significantly across German provinces. Different political conditions in a district, we have hypothesized, affect both the variation in the levels of political demand of candidates for this electoral support and the variation in the decisions of employees of the state to supply these political services. We will now formulate the main hypotheses concerning these differences.
Let us first consider how the tightness of a race affects the incentives of employees of the state to provide political support to candidates. From the perspective of employees of the state, narrow political races are associated with higher political uncertainty about the identity of the future political incumbent in a district. This implies that the willingness of the former to provide political support to candidates is likely to be lower in more contested electoral districts as compared to districts with less competitive races. This suggests that the tightness of a race has offsetting effects on the demand of candidates for support from employees of the state and on the decisions of the latter to supply these political services at elections. This implies that the overarching theoretical prediction about the overall relationship between the tightness of a race and the incidence of electoral irregularities is indeterminate.
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The second electoral variable, political fragmentation among right-wing parties in districts, whose outcome is determined during runoffs, is also likely to affect the incentives of state employees to provide electoral support at times of elections. State employees are more likely to intervene during elections in districts where one party enjoys strong local support and is expected to emerge as the winner. The situation is different, however, in districts with shifting political alliances and where the winner of the race is likely to result from such an alliance. From the perspective of local police or tax collectors, this situation increases uncertainty about administrative sanctions for their electoral intervention and for electoral support of the "wrong" political candidate. As a result, we expect political conditions that increase the need for such electoral coalitions (runoffs and high levels of political fragmentation on the right) to lower the incentives of state employees to supply political services during elections. This combination of variables is likely to have similar effects on the demand for electoral irregularities and the decisions of state employees to supply it. All things equal, we expect to find a lower incidence of electoral irregularities in districts with runoffs and a high fragmentation on the right.
Finally, we also expect a nonlinear relationship between the electoral strength of Social Democratic candidates in a district and the decision of employees of the state to provide electoral support at times of elections. On the one hand, police officers and tax collectors shared the preoccupation of right-wing candidates about the need to mount strong political resistance to the rise in political mobilization of Social Democratic candidates. On the other hand, they recognized the diminishing marginal returns and the possibly counterproductive nature of their electoral intervention in districts where Social Democratic candidates mustered a high level of electoral strength. Given that this political variable exerts reinforcing effects for the demand of candidates and the supply-side calculations of employees of the state, we expect, in aggregate, to find a non-linear relationship between the political strength of Social Democracy in a district and the incidence of electoral irregularities during elections.
The Decision of Employers to Supply Electoral Support at Times of Elections
In addition to enlisting police, teachers, and/or tax collectors as their agents, political candidates competing in elections to the German lower house could rely on electoral support from private actors at the time of elections. Both political and economic variables were likely to affect the calculations made by employers. With respect to political factors, we hypothesize that the most salient variable likely to influence the decision of employers to engage in electoral intimidation of their workforce is the political strength of Social Democratic candidates. Employers' incentives to intervene electorally are likely to be highest at intermediate levels of Social Democracy and lower at either low or very high levels of Social Democracy's electoral strength in a district. Other political variables such as the margin of a race or the political fragmentation on the right are less likely to influence the decisions of employers to supply political support to candidates. In contrast to employees of the state, private actors were less likely to fear sanctions or political reprisals if their preferred candidate lost the race.
In addition to the political considerations, the decisions of employers to intervene during elections were likely to be affected by economic conditions in a district. We hypothesize that the economic heterogeneity of a district affects the costs of electoral intimidation to private actors. We define an electoral district as being characterized by low economic heterogeneity (or high concentration) if economic output is concentrated in the hands of a very few number of firms that employ workers only in a very narrow number of occupations. By contrast, in a more heterogeneous economic district, employment and output are distributed among a large number of firms and occupations. Consider the limit case in which one single firm controls the entire economic output and employment in a district. In these districts, voters lack outside opportunities for employment and have very low economic power. In these economic environments, employers incur no additional economic costs for intimidation of workers or even for more "extreme" decisions such as laying off workers for their political choices made at the ballot box. As a result, in districts with high economic concentration, the costs of electoral repression for employers are low. We expect high and persistent levels of private electoral intimidation in these districts.
An increase in economic heterogeneity is likely to increase the costs of electoral repression for employers. Both an increase in the number of firms in a district and an increase in the number of occupations increase the costs of electoral repression. Electoral intimidation of workers is costlier for employers in districts with higher economic heterogeneity for two reasons. First, an increase in the number of competitors within the same industry increases the employment opportunities that are available for workers. Second, an increase in the number of occupations is also likely to increase the employment alternatives available to workers in other occupations. Thus, we hypothesize that in districts characterized by high economic heterogeneity, private actors face high costs of electoral intimidation and are likely to refrain from using electoral intimidation.
Other conditions in a district, in addition to economic heterogeneity, may also affect the economic costs of electoral intimidation encountered by private actors. One such variable that may have significant political consequences is the skill profile of the labor force. All things equal, one expects that employers encounter higher economic costs for the electoral intimidation of their workers in districts where they have made higher investments in the skills of their workforce. While explanations involving the importance of human capital play an important role in existing accounts of European democratization, these studies are based on theoretical conjectures that have not yet been subjected to a systematic empirical test. This article provides a first empirical test of the political consequences of the uneven distribution of human capital endowments across German electoral districts by examining the relationship between the distribution of skilled workers in a district and the incidence of electoral fraud.
A third economic variable that may affect the costs of electoral intimidation faced by private actors is the inequality in the distribution of farms. Rural inequality occupies a central role in recent economic accounts of democratization and is hypothesized to slow down the probability of transitions to democracy. Borrowing from these explanations, Daniel Ziblatt has argued in a recent study that rural inequality is an important predictor of the incidence of electoral fraud in Imperial Germany. In highly unequal districts, Ziblatt argues, powerful landlords have captured the state and used its institutions for electoral purposes. 7 Landholding inequality may affect the ability of rural employers to engage in the electoral intimidation of voters. However, we argue that Ziblatt's explanation, according to which rural inequality results in higher levels of electoral fraud because in districts with high levels of rural inequality landowners "captured the state," is underspecified. This explanation fails to account for the complex political calculations made by state employees in deciding whether to supply electoral support to candidates. One finds systematic variation in the electoral strategies pursued by bureaucratic officials even in districts characterized by high levels of rural inequality, which cannot be accounted for by the "state capture" hypothesis. Some of the political hypotheses outlined above, which highlight the complex considerations made by candidates on the right, can account for this variation. Even in Prussian districts characterized by high levels of landholding inequality, the breakdown of the electoral cartel between National Liberals and Conservatives increased political uncertainty. This, in turn, increased the reluctance of candidates to use the administrative apparatus during times of elections. An explanation invoking "state capture" cannot account for this temporal variation. Table 1 summarizes the above hypotheses about the economic and political factors that affect the production of electoral irregularities in Imperial Germany. We have derived these predictions about the incidence of electoral irregularities by disaggregating both demand-side considerations for electoral irregularities and supply-side considerations of employees of the state and private actors, the main actors responsible for the perpetration of electoral misconduct. The following section will subject these hypotheses to an empirical test. To test these theoretical hypotheses, we examine the effects of a district's political and economic conditions on the incidence of electoral fraud. Our dependent variable uses records of disputed elections considered by the German electoral commission (Wahlprüfungskommission) of the Reichstag during the period between 1870 and 1912.
The electoral commission of the Reichstag investigated these complaints, submitting cases that demonstrated evidence of violations of the provisions of electoral rules to the Reichstag. Our dependent variable comprises all cases submitted by the electoral commission to the Reichstag. Out of the total 5,152 seats that were contested in Germany during the thirteen elections held between 1871 and 1914, the commission submitted 974 complaints to the parliament. The contestation rate of German elections was close to 19 percent.
To explore some of the regional variation in the incidence of electoral fraud, Figure 1 presents information on the cumulative number of contested elections across Imperial Germany's 397 districts. The darker-shaded districts in Figure 1 are thus districts that
Figure 1 The Incidence of Disputed Elections in Germany
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The incidence of electoral fraud was particularly high both in Prussia and Saxony, but much lower in Baden and Württemberg. Electoral fraud remained relatively high in the small German principalities (such as Schwarzburg, Reuss, Waldeck, or Schaumburg Lippe) and in the Hanseatic cities, Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg. Elsaβ Lothringen, the region annexed by Germany in 1870, which was electorally contested between independent parties-Social Democrats, the Zentrum, and representatives of various splinter liberal movements-also experienced very high levels of electoral fraud. By contrast, Bavaria experienced remarkably low levels of electoral contestation throughout the Imperial Period.
Political Conditions in a District As discussed above, the demand and supply for electoral intimidation can be affected by a range of political variables. To test the political hypotheses outlined above, we construct a number of measures, using the ICPSR dataset on German elections. 8 We construct the following variables: "Margin" is a measure of the tightness of a race and is computed as the difference in electoral victory between the winner and runner-up in the decisive electoral round.
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As elaborated in the previous section, the theoretical predictions about the relationship between MARGIN and the incidence of electoral fraud are ambiguous. In tighter races, the demand of candidates for electoral irregularities is likely to increase, while the incentives of state employees and private actors to supply electoral support are likely to be lower in tighter races. We also include a control for the decisive round of the election, by including a variable which takes the value 1 if the election is determined in the second round ("runoff ").
"Strength of Social Democratic Candidate": To estimate the strength of the opposition candidate, we use a measure of the vote share of social democratic candidates during the first electoral round. As discussed above, we hypothesize a non-linear relationship between this variable and the incidence of electoral fraud. As such, we include both the measure of social democratic vote share and its quadratic in the specification ("Social Dem," "Social Dem Sq").
"Right Wing Electoral Fragmentation*Runoff ": To test the hypothesis that candidates refrain from engaging in the production of electoral irregularities in districts where electoral coordination is necessary, we include an interaction term between a measure of right-wing electoral fragmentation and runoffs. The measure of political fragmentation on the right is the effective number of right-wing parties.
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Economic Conditions in a District As hypothesized above, a variety of economic conditions in a district may affect the costs of electoral intimidation incurred by private actors. To develop precise measures that allow us to test these hypotheses, we digitized the statistical information collected by the German Statistical Office as part of its occupational census. 11 The occupational census was one of the most remarkable accomplishments of European data collection at the turn of the century.
We use both the 1895 and the 1905 wave of the occupational census to construct very precise measures of occupational heterogeneity and skill composition in German localities. Each of the two censuses contains over 400,000 lines of data that provide extremely fine-grained information on employment levels in 180 occupations across 1,000 municipalities throughout the German Empire. We aggregate these variables to the 397 electoral districts, using the mapping of localities into districts reported by CarlWilhelm Reibel.
12 Germany experienced no redistricting for the elections to the national parliament, which makes the mapping of localities to districts relatively straightforward.
Occupational Heterogeneity of a District
We have hypothesized that the costs for private actors to participate in electoral intimidation of voters are lowest in districts with high levels of employment concentration. In the extreme case, where one single firm controls the labor demand of a district, the firm faces no economic costs for electoral repression and can arbitrarily lay off workers for their political choices at the ballot box. The costs of electoral intimidation of private actors increase, however, as the occupational heterogeneity of a district increases.
The first measure of economic concentration at the district level is the HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) of employment concentration. As conventionally used in the literature on industrial organization, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is defined as the sum of the squares of employment shares of all occupations in a particular district. We construct:
where S stands for the employment share of occupational employment in each district. Higher values of the HHI indicate more concentrated economic structures, while lower values represent more decentralized regional economies. The occupational data are collected at two points in time during the period (1895 and 1905). We use a flat-steep-flat method of interpolation to interpolate data for the missing years. Figure 2 displays the variation in economic heterogeneity across German electoral districts, as measured by data collected in 1905. Darker-shaded districts represent higher levels of economic concentration, while lighter-shaded areas represent regions characterized by high economic heterogeneity. The visual presentation of the data is highly consistent with Herrigel's characterization of the differences in economic diversification across German regions. 13 The autarkic areas are found both in the Ruhr, Saarland, and Silesia. By contrast, Württemberg and Sachsen are areas characterized by higher levels of heterogeneity. The level of economic heterogeneity of the Arnsberg province in the Ruhr is two standard deviations higher than the average for Germany. By contrast, the economic heterogeneity in Württemberg or Sachsen-Weimar is below the economy-level average. Sachsen takes values of economic heterogeneity close to the national level.
Human Capital A number of recent studies have argued that human capital is an important predictor of political democratization during the nineteenth century.
14 Despite the emphasis on "co-specific assets" or skills as explanatory variables, these studies do not provide direct measures of the variation in the skill profile of workers across German regions. Cusack et al. evaluate these hypotheses about the importance of human capital by creating composite institutional measures of the strength of guilds, rural cooperatives, and associations of employers at the national level. 15 Thus, hypotheses about the political consequences of skills remain untested even in publications that seek to predict sub-national political outcomes across Germany.
We seek to remedy this empirical deficit of the existing literature by using precise measures of skill profiles of German localities. The data of the skill composition of the labor force have two different inputs. The first is a measure of the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in the 183 occupations of the census. As part of its 1895 census, the German Statistical Agency collected information on the ratio between skilled and unskilled workers in 183 occupations, which includes 161 industrial occupations and twenty-two occupations in services. In addition to this information on skill profiles, we
Figure 2 Level of Employment Concentration across German Electoral Districts (1905)
use the extreme disaggregated information on the employment share across all occupations, which we have also used to compute the measure of occupational heterogeneity. These two sources allow us to calculate the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers for each locality. In a final stage, we aggregate localities at the level of the electoral district to obtain measures of the density of human capital across the 397 electoral districts of Germany. Using the number of skilled workers in each district as an input, we compute two measures of skill profiles that differ in their respective denominator. The first is a measure of skills as a percentage of workers employed in industry ("Skill Industry"). The second is a ratio between skilled workers and all workers in the district ("Skill All").
Rural Inequality To test whether rural inequality affects the capability of private actors to engage in the production of electoral intimidation, we rely on the measure of rural inequality computed by Daniel Ziblatt. 16 The Gini measure of "Landholding Inequality" calculates the magnitude of the deviation from any perfectly equal distribution of agricultural land among landholders. Higher values of the Gini index indicate that larger farms account for a greater proportion of total agricultural land, while smaller values suggest that total farm acreage is relatively equally distributed among farms of different sizes. The variable is computed by Daniel Ziblatt, using data from the 1895 agricultural census.
Additional Controls
The electoral commission of the Reichstag had the prerogative to reject particular petitions as "frivolous." Commissions with different political compositions could thus introduce specific biases in the selection of cases of electoral irregularities. To control for these commission-specific effects, we have included a battery of controls that code differences in the composition of the electoral commission. These include a control for the number of members of the commission belonging to political parties that represented the interests of land-owners (Conservatives and Imperial Party) and a measure of the "professionalism," or "neutrality," of the commission chair. Finally, we use a measure of the ideological polarization of the election commission. All these variables are obtained from Daniel Ziblatt's study. 17 Finally, we use a battery of additional variables to control for other sources of variation across German districts. To control for differences in economic development, our models include a measure of the percentage of the population employed in the non-agricultural sector ("Economic Development"). We use a measure of the percentage of agricultural employment based on Carl-Wilhelm Reibel's study. 18 We also control for the religious differences across districts by including a measure of the percentage of Catholics in the population ("Catholics"). The source for this variable is the ICPSR dataset on German elections. 19 
Empirical Analysis: Examining the Incidence of Fraud in Germany
This section examines the political and economic determinants of electoral fraud in national elections to the German Reichstag, during the period between 1870 and 1912.
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We begin by presenting a set of models that test the hypotheses about the determinants of the demand for electoral fraud. These simplified models leave out a number of economic factors that may account for the decisions of employers to supply electoral irregularities and examine only the relationship between political variables in a district and the incidence of electoral irregularities. Given that the dependent variable is binary, we estimate a logistic model with fixed effects for the different provinces of Imperial Germany to control for unobserved region-specific characteristics.
The inclusion of these region-fixed effects can be justified both statistically and substantively. A Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no systematic difference in the coefficients in the random and fixed effects models at the 1 percent level, suggesting that the model with fixed effects for regions is preferable. In substantive terms, the inclusion of fixed effects is justified due to the large differences in electoral laws governing subnational elections across German regions. As argued by prominent historical studies of the period, subnational electoral practices exerted persistent effects on electoral practices in national elections. 20 Regional fixed effects are one way to reduce this unobserved heterogeneity and minimize omitted variable bias. Table 2 displays the results of these demand-side models. We examine the relationship between the electoral strength of Social Democratic candidates, the tightness of a race, and of the political fragmentation among right-wing parties (both in the presence and absence of runoffs) and incidences of electoral fraud. These models also control for the religious fragmentation of a district "Catholics," "Population," the level of "Economic Development" (percentage of non-agricultural employment,) and for the composition of the electoral commission. The models also include a lagged dependent variable for the presence of electoral irregularities during the previous election.
Model 1 reports a baseline specification that includes the political variables that are hypothesized to affect the incidence of fraud and some of the demographic controls. To examine the relationship between the electoral strength of opposition candidates and the incidence of electoral fraud, Model 1 includes both a linear measure of the vote share of the Social Democratic candidates in a district and its quadratic ("SPD Vote Share," "SPD Vote Sq"). The coefficient of the vote share by Social Democrats is negative and that of its quadratic term is positive. Both coefficients are statistically significant at the conventional levels. These results lend support to the hypothesis that the incentives of candidates to trespass the boundaries of the electoral law and engage in electoral intimidation were highest at intermediate levels of strength of Social Democratic candidates.
In Model 1, we have also examined the hypothesis about the factors that are likely to lower the incentives of candidates to deploy resources that might violate the provisions of electoral law at times of elections. We have hypothesized that candidates' incentives to refrain from a heavy-handed deployment of the state apparatus are higher in districts whose outcomes are decided in runoffs and where we find high levels of political fragmentation on the right. To test these hypotheses, we include measures of right-wing political fragmentation ("ENRP"), runoffs ("Second"), and their interaction ("ENRP"*"Second").
The first panel in Figure 3 plots the predicted probability of the incidence of electoral fraud for different levels of Social Democratic strength. As can be seen from the figure, the predicted incidence of electoral fraud peaks at levels of Social Democratic strength of around 30 percent, but declines as the level of Social Democratic strength in the district increases above this value. Holding all other variables in the regression at the mean, the predicted probability of fraud at very low levels of Social Democratic vote Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
share (lowest decile) is 0.16. The predicted level of electoral fraud in districts where the Social Democratic strength takes average values for the sample is 0.22. By contrast, in districts with very high levels of Social Democratic vote share (highest decile in the sample), the probability of electoral fraud is only 0.007 percent. The second panel in Figure 3 displays the relationship between runoffs, political fragmentation on the right, and the incidence of electoral fraud. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find lower incidence of electoral fraud in districts that are decided in runoffs and characterized by high levels of electoral fragmentation. We also find that the incidence of electoral intimidation is higher in tighter races. As discussed above, the theoretical expectation about the relationship between the tightness of a race and the incidence of electoral irregularities was ambiguous. While the demand of candidates for electoral irregularities was likely to increase as the race became more competitive, the uncertainty of political outcomes could deter state employees from intervening at times of elections. The empirical results suggest that the demandside considerations of candidates outweighed the considerations of state officials, affecting their willingness to intervene during elections. Holding all other variables at their mean values, a change in margin of victory from the mean to maximum value will decrease the probability of electoral fraud from 0.18 to 0.10 with a 95 percent confidence interval of (0.05, 0.15).
Models 2-5 examine the robustness of these results by adding various measures of the political composition of the electoral commission that investigated electoral irregularities. As discussed above, the composition of the electoral commission could affect the selection of cases of fraud that were submitted to the Reichstag. We use the three measures developed by Daniel Ziblatt to capture various characteristics of the commission of the Reichstag. In Model 2, we add a variable that measures the political composition of the Wahlprüfungskomission. We find a positive relationship between this measure and the incidence of electoral fraud. Model 3 adds a measure that measures neutrality of the commission chair. Differences in the neutrality of the commission have no impact on the types of cases of fraud that are selected. In Model 4, we add a variable that measures the share of conservative politicians on the commission to the model but Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
In Table 3 , we present a range of models that test both the economic and political hypotheses about the production of electoral irregularities in German elections. As hypothesized, economic conditions in a district affect the likely costs of electoral repression incurred by employers and their incentives to engage in the production of electoral intimidation. The first three models reported in Table 3 add each of the economic variables that may affect private actors' incentives to intervene at elections. In Model 1, we add the time-varying measure of the economic heterogeneity of the district. We find a strong and positive relationship between the employment concentration of a district and the incidence of electoral fraud. The effect is also substantive in magnitude. Holding all other variables at their mean values, a change in the level of employment concentration from its mean to maximum value will increase the probability of electoral intimidation from 0.36 to 0.56. In Model 2, we include a measure of the skill profile of the labor force in a district to the baseline specification that includes only political variables. While the sign of the variable is negative, the relationship between this variable and the incidence of electoral irregularities does not achieve statistical significance at conventional levels. This suggests that the presence of a more skilled labor force does not constrain the decisions of private actors to engage in political intimidation. In Model 3, we add a control for the level of rural inequality in a district. In this specification, we find a positive relationship between the level of landholding inequality and the incidence of fraud, consistent with the results reported in Daniel Ziblatt's study. 21 The sign and statistical significance of the political variables remain unaffected by the inclusion of these economic controls. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the electoral strength of Social Democratic candidates and the incidence of fraud. The incidence of electoral fraud is higher in narrower races. Finally, in examining the relationship between the right-wing political fragmentation and the incidence of electoral fraud, we find that increased fragmentation on the right constrains candidates' incentives to use electoral fraud in districts that are decided during runoffs. By contrast, in races that are decided during the first electoral round, we find a positive relationship between right-wing fragmentation and the incidence of fraud.
Some results on the other control variables are also noteworthy. First, the incidence of electoral fraud is lower in districts with a large Catholic population. We also find a lower incidence of fraud in more developed districts with a higher percentage of the labor force employed in manufacturing or services. Also, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between two of the commission-level variables-the polarization of the commission and its "conservativeness"-and the incidence of electoral fraud. While some commissionlevel effects are present, we find that more conservative and more polarized commissions were more likely to allow a larger number of cases to be considered by the Reichstag.
Conclusion
This article has formulated a political explanation of the incentives of politicians, state employees, and private actors to demand and supply activities that violated the provisions of the electoral law resulting in electoral irregularities. We have attempted to specify both the factors that are likely to affect the demand of candidates for electoral activities that trespass the boundaries set by the electoral law and the decisions of two types of agents-state employees and private actors-to supply these political activities at times of elections. We tested three political and three economic hypotheses about the determinants of electoral irregularities in German elections.
Political conditions in a district stand in a strong relationship with the probability of electoral fraud. One of the main objectives of political intervention at times of elections was the effort to stem the political activities of Social Democratic candidates. We found a nonlinear relationship between the strength of Social Democracy and the incidence of fraud: the probability of electoral intervention was highest at intermediate levels of electoral strength of Social Democracy but lower at high levels of political strength. In the districts where electoral strength of Social Democracy was high, the marginal returns of electoral intervention were lower, which led to both a reduction in the demand and supply for electoral irregularities.
We have also examined empirically the relationship between additional measures of electoral competition and the incidence of electoral fraud. The first of these variables is the tightness of a race. We found that the incidence of electoral fraud was higher in tighter races. Finally, we have found a lower incidence of electoral irregularity in districts that were contested during runoffs and that were characterized by a high level of electoral fragmentation on the right. The need to form electoral coalitions among nonsocial democratic candidates constrained the use of electoral intimidation.
In addition to these political hypotheses, we have examined the relationship between three types of economic conditions in a district and the incidence of electoral fraud. We have conjectured that the occupational heterogeneity of a district is likely to increase the costs of electoral repression to private actors and, thus, constrain the willingness of private actors to engage in the production of electoral irregularities. Empirically, this paper has documented the existence of a positive relationship between the economic concentration of a district and the probability of electoral fraud that is robust across different specifications and across different measures of occupational heterogeneity. These findings lend support to the hypothesis that the costs of electoral intimidation to private actors are lower in districts where a limited number of firms control output and employment but that they increase as the economic heterogeneity of the district increases. Landholding inequality, a second district-level variable that can affect the ability of private actors to engage in electoral intimidation, has a weaker and less robust relationship with the incidence of electoral fraud.
Finally, our article has examined whether the presence of a high number of skilled workers in a district constrains the incentives of employers to engage in electoral intimidation. In our analysis, we test the central theoretical premise advanced by varieties of capitalism studies. These scholars have hypothesized that the presence of a high number of workers with vocational skills facilitates inter-class political consensus and cooperative relations between employers and their employees. In our empirical analysis, we have used extremely fine-grained measures of the distribution of vocational skills across all German localities. We found no empirical relationship between the depth of vocational skills in a district and the incidence of electoral fraud. A higher concentration of vocational skills did not constrain the incentives of private actors to engage in electoral fraud. Therefore, the empirical results challenge the central theoretical prediction of varieties of capitalism scholars. The study of electoral irregularities in Imperial Germany shows that vocational skills did not constrain German employers from engaging in the systematic electoral harassment of their employees. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
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